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Abstract
In his well-known Information Dispersal Algorithm paper, Rabin showed a way to distribute
information in n pieces among n servers in such a way that recovery of the information is possible
in the presence of up to t inactive servers. An enhanced mechanism to enable construction in
the presence of malicious faults, which can intentionally modify their pieces of the information,
was later presented by Krawczyk. Yet, these methods assume that the malicious faults occur
only at reconstruction time.
In this paper we address the more general problem of secure storage and retrieval of informa-
tion (SSRI), and guarantee that also the process of storing the information is correct even when
some of the servers fail. Our protocols achieve this while maintaining the (asymptotical) space
optimality of the above methods.
We also consider SSRI with the added requirement of condentiality, by which no party except
for the rightful owner of the information is able to learn anything about it. This is achieved
through novel applications of cryptographic techniques, such as the distributed generation of
receipts, distributed key management via threshold cryptography, and \blinding".
An interesting byproduct of our scheme is the construction of a secret sharing scheme with
shorter shares size in the amortized sense. An immediate practical application of our work is a
system for the secure deposit of sensitive data. We also extend SSRI to a \proactive" setting,
where an adversary may corrupt all the servers during the lifetime of the system, but only a
fraction during any given time interval. c© 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The notion of information dispersal was introduced by Rabin [32] in his well-
known Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA). The basic approach taken in IDA is
to distribute the information being stored, F , into n pieces among n active servers, in
such a way that the retrieval of F is possible even in the presence of up to t failed
(inactive) servers. The salient point was to achieve this goal while incurring a small
overhead in needed memory. And indeed Rabin’s result is space optimal. Retrieval
of F is possible from n − t pieces, where each piece is of length jF j=(n − t). (For
completeness, we include a short overview and example of IDA in Appendix A.)
In addition to its optimal space complexity, the IDA technique has very attractive
properties as it permits any party in the system to retrieve the distributed information
(by communicating with the piece holders); it does not require a central authority;
it is symmetric with respect to all participants; and no secret cryptographic keys are
involved. However, this combination of very desirable properties is achieved at the
expense of limiting the kind of faults against which the algorithm is robust, namely,
by assuming that available pieces are always unmodied.
An enhanced mechanism to reconstruct the information when more general faults
occur was presented by Krawczyk [28], who called this problem { and its solution
{ the Secure Information Dispersal problem=algorithm (SIDA). This mechanism is
able to tolerate malicious servers that can intentionally modify their pieces of the
information, and is also space optimal (asymptotically). In a nutshell, SIDA makes
use of a cryptographic tool called distributed ngerprints, which basically consists
of each processor’s piece being hashed { the ngerprints, and then distributing this
value among all servers using the coding function of an error correcting code (e.g.,
Reed-Solomon [1]) that is able to reconstruct from altered pieces. This way, the correct
servers are able to reconstruct the ngerprints using the code’s decoding function, check
whether pieces of the le were correctly returned, and nally reconstruct F from the
correct pieces using the IDA algorithm.
Our contributions. A shortcoming of these methods is that they assume that the
faults only occur at reconstruction time, after the dispersal of the pieces has been
properly done. In this paper we address the more general problem of secure storage
and retrieval of information (SSRI), and guarantee that also the process of storing the
information is correct even when some of the servers fail. We consider the scenario
in which a user interacts with the storage system by depositing a le and receiving a
proof (in the form of a receipt) that the deposit was correctly executed.
For eciency reasons our design makes the distributed nature of the system trans-
parent to the user. This is achieved by having the client interact with a single server,
called the gateway (GW). This design choice avoids the need for lengthy computa-
tions and, above all, parallel connections to several servers from the client. On the other
hand, choosing the gateway option adds the extra technical diculty of designing the
protocol in a way that the gateway is not a single point of failure. (See Section 2 for
further elaboration on the model.)
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First we concern ourselves only with the integrity of the information, i.e. we re-
quire that retrieved data be correct. We introduce simple protocols that extend the
above methods to enable storage in the presence of malicious faults, while maintain-
ing the (asymptotical) space optimality of the above methods. Namely, each piece is
of size jF j=(n − t) plus a small quantity which does not depend on the size of the
le (but on n and a security parameter). Our storage protocol is designed so that
some form of consistency is maintained among the servers without incurring the cost
of (potentially expensive) agreement protocols. Another important technical element
of the storage protocol is the generation of receipts for the deposit of les through
the application of distributed digital signatures. It is guaranteed by our protocols that
a receipt is issued only when the correct information has been stored in the correct
servers.
We also consider SSRI with the added requirement of condentiality of the informa-
tion being deposited, i.e., that any collusion of up to t servers (except ones including
the rightful owner of the information) should not be able to learn anything about it.
Condentiality of information is easily achieved by encryption. Yet, this in turn poses
the problem of key management, that is, the safe deposit { in the same storage system
{ of the cryptographic key used to encrypt the le that is being deposited. Under this
scheme, how would the user be able to retrieve his le condentially? Remember that
in our design he communicates with the system through a single gateway, which means
that if only the standard techniques of secret sharing reconstruction were used [7, 35],
then the gateway would know all the information available to the user. One novel
component of our condentiality protocol for the solution of the above problem is its
distributed key management aspect, achieved through the application of a combination
of threshold cryptography (see Section 2.5) and blinding techniques [5].
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
 We consider the more general problem of information storage and retrieval, guaran-
teeing that also the process of storing the information is secure in the presence of
(maliciously) failing servers. Our solutions have an (asymptotically) optimal blow-
up factor, and tolerate up to t<n=2 malicious servers.
 Novel applications of cryptographic techniques, namely, the generation of receipts via
distributed digital signatures, distributed key management via threshold cryptography,
and blinding (together with threshold cryptography) in the context of decryptions
rather than signatures.
 Secret sharing made \shorter": An interesting by-product of our constructions is a
(computational) secret sharing scheme which achieves shorter size shares, in the
amortized sense, than the one of [29].
 \Proactive" SSRI: SSRI robust against an adversary which may corrupt all servers
during the system’s lifetime, but only up to t during each time interval [3, 30].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
the model, necessary denitions, and description of the tools that we use in this paper.
In Section 3 we describe the protocols for basic SSRI (i.e., integrity only), while
in Section 4 we present SSRI with the added requirement of condentiality of the
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information. In Section 5 we present the scheme for secret sharing with shorter shares,
while in Section 6 we show how to make SSRI \pro-actively" secure.
2. Model, denitions, and system considerations
In this section we describe our distributed model and give denitions for the task
of secure storage and retrieval of information. We also list the cryptographic tools that
we need in the sequel.
2.1. The distributed model
We start by describing an abstraction of the distributed system we consider. We
consider a communication network with two classes of entities: the users, denoted
U1; U2; : : : ; Um, and the servers, denoted V1; : : : ; Vn. We will sometimes refer to the
servers collectively as V . It is among the servers that the distributed storage of the
information takes place.
We model the communication among the servers by a completely connected graph
of authenticated links; for the purpose of this paper we also assume a point-to-point
communication link between each of the users and every server. 2 (Actually, only
t + 1 direct connections are needed, where t is an upper bound on the number of
malfunctioning servers, as explained later.) Thus, links do not guarantee secrecy, but
this can be achieved through the use of encryption. In fact, all the parties are assumed
to be computationally bounded, so that the underlying cryptographic primitives that
are used by our protocols (see Section 2.4) can be considered secure, and the security
assertions that we make hold with high probability.
We assume the availability of a global clock, which allows the network computation
to proceed as a series of rounds. 3
It is assumed that at any time during the life of the system, at most t of the n servers
can malfunction, possibly in malicious ways. Further, we assume that the faulty servers
can even collude and act in concert in order to disrupt the computation { e.g., in a
plain spoiling manner; try to prevent the storage or reconstruction of a le; or learn
some information (e.g., a key) which the user wants to keep private. We also assume
that n>2t. The users, on the other hand, are assumed to always behave correctly; given
the application, the case of malfunctioning users is not interesting and can be easily
detected.
As mentioned in the Introduction, in our protocols the users will interact with a
single, not necessarily the same, distinguished server called the gateway (GW). Never-
2 What we have in mind is Web implementations of our design. In such environments, authenticated com-
munication can be realized through, e.g., SSL [27]. Similarly, point-to-point communication can be realized
in various ways, and not necessarily through a direct connection.
3 Again, this is for simplicity of exposition, as the only thing we need is a reliable time-out mechanism,
and a means to guarantee the freshness of authentication. Possible realizations of the latter are via time
stamps, or just nonces. See, e.g., [6].
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theless, our design shall be uniform in the sense that all servers will be able to perform
the same distribution and recovery functions.
Remark 1. Interacting with a single server enables an adversary to create a simple
\denial-of-service" attack by simply crashing the GW. However, as demonstrated in
Section 3, our global clock (reliable time-out) and n>2t assumptions guarantee that a
user will eventually contact a working server.
An alternative design choice would be to have the user contact each of the servers
directly { call this the \multiple connections" model. The reasons for our choice of a
single connection=single gateway are two-fold:
{ Broad applicability: As already pointed out (footnote of Section 2.1), we aim at
broad applicability, meaning that users (e.g., browsers) with not much of an add-on
burden should be able to use the application we are proposing. This justies the
use of a single connection (e.g., http) at a time between the user and a gateway,
as well as trying to minimize the number of functions (e.g., IDA; secret sharing;
storage of many signatures) that have to be performed by the user.
{ Eciency considerations: Besides the functionality requirements, we would also like
to minimize the computation and communication overhead on the user (in fact, in
turn this also widens our applicability basis). As shown in Appendix D, both eorts
are more demanding on the user in the case of multiple communications with the
servers. (However, for a meaningful interpretation of the issues involved in the
comparison, the reader should postpone its reading until after Sections 3 and 4.)
We now turn to the description of a major building block that we use in this paper.
2.2. Information dispersal algorithm
Rabin [32] proposed an algorithm that breaks a le F of length L= jF j into n
pieces Fi; 16i6n, each of length jFij=L=m, so that every m pieces suce for the
reconstructing F . Note that the sum of the length of the pieces is (n=m)  L. This algo-
rithm, known as the Information Dispersal Algorithm has many applications to reliable
storage and transmission of information. This algorithm is not only space ecient but
also computationally ecient.
This algorithm should be contrasted with Shamir’s algorithm [35] for secret sharing,
which breaks a string F into n pieces each of the same size as F , so the F can be
reconstructed from any m pieces. However, the main dierence is that in this secret
sharing scheme, any m− 1 pieces give no information about F . On the other hand, in
IDA less than m pieces may give some information about F .
In a later section (Section 5) we will show how IDA can be used to implement
secret sharing more eciently if we relax some of the conditions.
The actual details of the IDA algorithm (tuned to our application) are given in
Appendix A.
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2.3. Denitions
We now proceed to give the main denitions of our paper.
Denition 1. An n-server system is a t-resilient Secure Storage and Retrieval of In-
formation system (SSRI for short) if up to t<n of the servers can malfunction, and
for any user U holding le F there exist two protocols Deposit and Retrieval
satisfying the following conditions:
Deposit availability: User U wishing to deposit F will always manage to do so, and
will receive a receipt (proof of deposit).
Deposit correctness: If a receipt is generated by the servers for F , then each correct
server has a copy of the le.
Retrieval availability: User U will always be able to retrieve F .
The above denition captures the notion of a storage system in which it is possible
to store information, and which is able to preserve its integrity, even when a fraction
of the servers malfunction; we will sometimes refer to such a system as \basic SSRI".
The next denition extends the storage system to provide condentiality as well.
Denition 2. A SSRI with condentiality is a SSRI system which additionally is
t-private. Namely, the following condition also holds:
Condentiality: No coalition of at most t parties (not including the rightful owner of
the le) can learn anything about the contents of the le F .
Note that the denition of Condentiality also applies to coalitions which include
the gateway. We now turn to a denition that measures the quality of information
dispersal methods. The following paragraph and denition are taken from [28].
Reconstruction is possible in information dispersal methods because some redun-
dancy is added to the n pieces into which the original information is partitioned. The
amount of redundancy in an information dispersal method is typically measured by the
following parameter.
Denition 3. The blow-up factor (or just blow-up) of an information dispersal scheme
is the ratio between the total size of the information being dispersed and the size of
the original information. (By total size we mean the sum of sizes of all distributed
pieces.)
The blow-up of the original method of Rabin [32] is n=(n − t), while the one of
Krawczyk [28] is [n=(n− t)]+o(1) (i.e., it requires an additional small quantity which
does not depend on the size of the le). This is clearly (asymptotically) optimal if
only n − t pieces are to be used for reconstruction. Our methods also maintain this
latter bound. We remark that reconstruction of information is also possible through
error correction codes. However, the inherent blow-up factor deteriorates to n=(n− 2t)
in this case (see [1, 28]).
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 Keys:
VKU , SKU Public verication and private signing keys of user=party U .
EKU , DKU Public encryption and private decryption keys of user=party U .
dkU;Vi Server Vi’s share of private decryption key of user U .
CERTU Public key certicate of user U , which includes U , EKU
and CA’s signature of EKU .
VKV , SKV Public verication and private signing keys of V .
skVi Server Vi’s share of private key SKV .
 Cryptographic primitives:
H() A strong collision-resistant one-way hash function. Think of H()
as returning \random" values.
EU Public key encryption using EKU .
SU () Digital signature with respect to SKU . We assume the signature
function hashes the message before signing.
SV () (Distributed) digital signature with respect to keys skV1 ; : : : ; skVn .
Vi () Partial digital signature with respect to skVi
eK Symmetric key-based encryption algorithm, taking key K and a
plaintext, and producing the ciphertext.
Fig. 1. Keys and cryptographic primitives.
We now turn to describe the various cryptographic mechanisms that our protocols
will make use of.
2.4. Cryptographic terminology and tools
The cryptographic primitives used in the protocols are summarized in Fig. 1.
All the users have two pairs of public=secret keys. (For simplicity, we will as-
sume that the servers also act as the certication authority (CA), so that no third
party needs to be involved in the transactions in order to verify the validity of the
public keys.) One key pair (SKU , VKU ) is used for authentication (\signing") and
verication purposes (resp.); 4 the other key pair (DKU , EKU ) is used for public-key
decryption and encryption (resp.). DKU is kept \shared" at the servers, each server
Vi; 16i6n, storing dkU;Vi . Explanation of how this done and motivation are given in
Sections 2.5 and 2.7, respectively. Similarly, the servers V share their own key pair
(VKV , SKV ); that is, each server Vi stores skVi , its share of private key SKV . We
4 This is a natural assumption, as if for example the realization of our design is through a Web application,
all browsers provide authentication in one form or another.
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make the usual security assumptions on these cryptographic primitives as summarized
below.
We say that the signature scheme S is secure if it is secure against adaptive chosen
message attack as dened in [23]. Informally, that means that an attacker who does
not know the secret key SK and is given signatures on messages of its choice, will
not be able to produce the signature for a new message.
We say that the encryption scheme E, is secure if it is semantically secure as dened
in [22]. Informally, that means that the encryption scheme is randomized and that the
value E(m; r) (which denotes the public key encryption of message m with the help
of pseudorandom number r) is computationally indistinguishable from a truly random
string.
The following two subsections describe two major tools that we use in our protocols.
2.5. Threshold cryptography
The security of cryptographic protocols relies mainly on the security of the secret
keys used in these protocols. Security means that these keys should be kept secret from
unauthorized parties, but at the same time should always be available to the legitimate
users.
Threshold cryptography is the name given to a body of techniques that help in
achieving the above goals. In a nutshell suppose you have a key K which is used in
the computation of some cryptographic function f on a message m, denote the results
with fK (m). Examples of this include fK (m) to be a signature of m under key K , or
a decryption of m under that key.
In a threshold cryptography scheme the key K is shared among a set of players
P1; : : : ; Pn using a (t; n) secret sharing scheme [35]. Let Ki be the share given to player
Pi. 5 Recall that by the denition of (t; n) secret sharing, we know that t shares give
no information about K , but t+1 shares allow reconstruction of the key K . The main
goal of the threshold cryptography technique is to compute fK without ever recon-
structing the key K , but rather using it implicitly when the function fK needs to be
computed.
A distributed threshold decryption protocol for P1; : : : ; Pn is a protocol that takes
as input a ciphertext c which has been encrypted with K−1, K’S associated public key
(i.e., c=EK−1 (m) for some message m), and outputs m.
A distributed threshold signature protocol for P1; : : : ; Pn is a protocol that takes as
input a message m and outputs a signature  for m under K
5 There are two kinds of protocols for key generation: with or without a dealer. In a protocol with a
dealer, it is assumed a trusted entity that produces the secret key K (with possibly an associated public-key
K−1), and then shares the key among the players. The dealer then \self-destroys". Notice that this assumes
some trust in this entity since it knows the key in its entirety for a period of time. In a protocol without a
dealer, the players themselves run a distributed protocol with some random inputs. This results in player Pi
holding a share Ki of a secret key K .
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The above protocols must be secure, i.e., they must reveal no information about the
secret key K . A threshold cryptography protocol is called t-robust if it also tolerates t
malicious faults.
Using threshold cryptography increases the secrecy of the key since now an attacker
has to break into t + 1 servers in order to nd out the value of K . Also, the basic
approach increases the availability of the key in the presence of so-called fail-stop
faults (crashes); indeed, there is a need only for t + 1 servers to be functioning in
order to be able to compute the function FK , meaning that one can tolerate up to
n− t − 1 crashes.
Threshold cryptography was originated in works by Desmedt [11], Boyd [2], Croft
and Harris [8], and Desmedt and Frankel [12]. A survey of threshold cryptography tech-
niques can be found in [13]. Protocols for discrete log-based threshold cryptosystems
can be found in [2, 4, 12, 24, 31, 20]. Protocols for RSA-based threshold cryptosystems
include [9, 10, 15, 19, 33]. In Appendix B we present an example of threshold cryptog-
raphy applied to RSA [34].
The fault tolerance of the SSRI protocols we present in this paper (n>2t) is inher-
ited from the fault tolerance of the distributed threshold signature=decryption protocols
[15, 19, 21, 14, 33], which is optimal.
2.6. Blinding
The cryptographic technique called blinding [5] can be explained as follows. Suppose
that a server holds a secret key DK which allows it to compute decryptions in the
public key encryption scheme E. Assume also that the matching encryption key EK is
known.
We say that the encryption scheme is blindable if the functions EEK and EDK are
homomorphic, i.e., E(ab)=E(a)E(b).
Blindable encryption schemes allow to solve the following problem. A user wants
to obtain the result of m=EDK(c) but without telling the server the value c he wants
to be decrypted.
The user generates a random string r, computes the value s=EEK(r) using the
public key EK and presents the server with the value c  s which is random and thus
gives no information about c. The server returns the value EDK(c  s) which, by the
homomorphic properties of EDK, is equal to EDK(c)EDK(s)=m  r. Thus, if the user
divides the returned result by r he obtains the desired output.
Example of blindable encryption schemes include RSA [34] and most of the discrete-
log based systems (e.g., ElGamal [17]). Appendix C contains an example of blinding
using RSA.
A novelty of our scheme is the way we use blinding. Traditionally this technique
was introduced to obtain signatures on messages that the server would not know [5].
This was in turn used to produce untraceable electronic cash. We use blinding in the
context of decryptions rather than signatures in order to enhance the security of our
distributed key management. The use of blinding will protect the privacy of the user’s
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information against all servers (in particular the gateway GW { see Section 3), hence
eliminating any single point of privacy failure from the system.
2.7. Key management
Our design takes advantage of the distributed environment to safely store some of the
cryptographic keys used by the user. Recall from Section 2.4 that a user has two pairs of
keys associated with him, one for authentication and the other for encryption. Regarding
the storage of the private signing key SKU , we have the user keep it (ideally in his
smartcard, or, alternatively, managed by the application, e.g., browser). The reason is
that there is no major security drawback in doing so, as if this key is compromised then
the user can easily revoke it and get a new one. All past signatures generated under this
key will still be valid, by the existence of the corresponding public verication key.
Conversely, the loss of the private decryption key DKU would result in the loss
of all the data encrypted under this key. For this reason, it is not advisable to store
such a key in a single device, either held by the user or by the servers. Thus, in our
design the private decryption key DKU is kept shared at the servers, each server Vi,
16i6n, storing dkU;Vi . This way, more than t servers will have to be corrupted in
order to recover DKU . In order to decrypt a message for the user the servers will
use such shares to run a distributed threshold decryption protocol (cf. Section 2.5).
Further details about this procedure are given when we treat SSRI with Condentiality
in Section 4.
2.8. Comments on protocol presentation and optimization
Before we turn to the presentation of our protocols, we remark that various opti-
mizations can be carried out. These include reducing the number of \echo" messages;
reducing their size (e.g., only re-transmit the le when necessary, send its hash instead);
sending acknowledgment messages back upon receiving a le; arranging elds so that
cryptographic operations do not have to be computed twice; the use of \nonces", or
transaction id’s in order to prevent so-called \re-play" attacks; coping with \denial of
service" attacks from incorrect servers, etc. In the presentation we omit such details
for clarity’s sake.
3. Integrity only
The protocols of this section extend the methods of [28, 32] for integrity to achieve
SSRI while maintaining (asymptotically) the space optimality. Namely, each piece of
the le F deposited at each server is of size jF j=(n− t) plus a small quantity which
does not depend on the size of the le. We distinguish the following three transactions
in basic SSRI:
{ Deposit: User U contacts the gateway GW, deposits le F , and gets a receipt.
{ Dispersal: The actual information dispersal takes place among the servers Vj.
{ Retrieval: The user contacts GW to get F back.
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 Fields:
F User’s le to be deposited at the servers.
 Protocol Flows:
DRequest :U
F;SU (F)−−−−−! GW
DExecution1 : GW
F;SU (F)−−−−−! Vj; 8j
DExecution2 : Vj; 8j
F;SU (F)−−−−−! Vi; 8i
DExecution3 : GW
Vj (U;F) −−−−− Vj from DExecution1
Receipt :U
SV (U;F) −−−−− GW
Fig. 2. Sketch of the Deposit Protocol.
We would like the protocols for Deposit and Retrieval to satisfy Denition 1. The
protocol for Dispersal will ensure our claimed blow-up factor.
3.1. Deposit
The Deposit protocol is initiated by user U . The user contacts one of the servers
(GW) and transmits a request for deposit (this request includes a digital signature on
the le being stored). The user will conclude that the deposit has been carried out
successfully once she receives a receipt from GW.
Fig. 2 shows the (fault-free) ow of the protocol for Deposit.
We now describe the protocol in more detail. In DRequest, the user contacts GW
and submits the le she wants to deposit, together with her signature on the le under
her private signing key. In DExecution1 the GW forwards the request from the pre-
vious ow to the (remaining) servers. In DExecution2, every server receiving a valid
message from GW (i.e., one whose signature veries) \echos" this message request to
every other server; in the case of an invalid message, the server discards the request.
Servers receiving at least one valid message store F as a valid request from user U .
In DExecution3, each server Vi receiving the DExecution1 message from GW uses its
share skVi of the private signing key SKV to generate a partial signature on F and U ,
and sends this message to GW. Servers not receiving a DExecution1 message from
GW do not participate. In Receipt, the GW uses the partial signatures received from
the other servers to compute the distributed digital signature on F and U , and sends it
to the user, who veries the signature using VKV . This constitutes the receipt for the
user’s deposit. The user stores it for future use. Note that GW must have (at least)
(t + 1) partial signatures in order to generate the receipt (cf. Section 2.5).
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If the user does not receive a receipt from GW afer some pre-specied period of
time, she tries a dierent server.
We now show the following about the Deposit protocol.
Lemma 1. If the signature scheme S is secure; then protocol Deposit satises the
Deposit Availability and Correctness conditions of Denition 1.
Proof. Deposit availability. If GW does not respond to the user with a receipt, then
user U will turn to another server in order to deposit the le. As, by assumption, the
number of servers n>2t and the design of the servers is uniform, it is guaranteed that
the user will eventually contact a correct GW. (For example, if U chooses the next
server at random, then the expected number of trials will be 2.) Once this happens
every correct server Vi gets the user’s message, veries the message authenticity using
the user’s public verication key, and replies to GW with a partial signature under
share skVi of private key SKV . GW combines the partial signatures and sends a correct
receipt to the user. Because the signature scheme is secure a correct signature can be
generated only by the user, thus the servers will not store les that were not produced
by the user.
Deposit correctness. Under the assumption that the signature scheme is secure, if a
receipt is generated for le F then there were at least t+1 partial signatures generated
for this le under the servers’ shares of the private key SKV . As by assumption at
most t of the servers can be faulty, at least one of the partial signatures was generated
by a correct server. A correct server generates a partial signature only if it has received
a valid deposit request from GW, and in this case it also echoes the le to all the
other servers (DExecution2 in Fig. 2). Hence, every correct server has a copy of the
le.
3.2. Dispersal
There is no communication involved in the Dispersal transaction; it basically con-
sists of a local computation at each server. Dispersal is initiated by the servers right
after receiving a deposit request whose signature is veried, regardless of whether the
request was received from GW directly, or as an echo from another server. Each server
computes the pieces of F corresponding to all the servers using IDA, then computes
the corresponding hashes of the pieces, and saves its own piece of the le and all the
hashes. The sketch for this transaction is shown in Fig. 3.
Lemma 2. Protocol Dispersal achieves a [n=(n− t)] + o(1) blow-up.
Proof. Each server saves its own IDA portion of the le jFij, plus all the hashes
H(Fj); 16j6n. Since, for all i; j, jFij= jFjj and jH(Fi)j= jH(Fj)j=O(1), for all
i; j, the space required at each server is jFij+ njH(Fi)j, and the total space is njFij+
n2jH(Fi)j. The rst term follows from the IDA blow-up bound, and the second from
the fact that jH(Fi)j is independent of the size of F .
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 Fields:
F User’s le to be dispersed among servers Vi; 16i6n.
Fi Portion of le F dispersed at server Vi.
H(Fi) Hash of Fi.
 Protocol Steps:
Each server Vi; 16i6n, does:
8j; 16j6n, compute Fj =F  Tj(IDA);
8j; 16j6n, compute H(Fj);
save Fi and H(Fj); 16j6n.
Fig. 3. Dispersal Protocol.
In contrast, Krawczyk [28] suggests to share the hashes of the pieces themselves
using Reed{Solomon codes. The space required by that method at each server is jFij+
[n=(n − 2t)]jH(Fi)j. Thus, our approach is slightly less storage-ecient, but with the
advantage of avoiding the complexity of the coding plus the communication. (Also
note that for values of realistic implementations { e.g., n=5 and t=2 { the storage
requirements would be identical.)
3.3. Retrieval
Retrieval is the transaction initiated by a user in order to retrieve a le she
has previously deposited, and for which she has received a receipt. Our protocol for
Retrieval satises the Retrieval Availability condition of Denition 1. The protocol
is shown in Fig. 4.
We now describe the protocol in detail. In Retrieval Request the user contacts GW
(not necessarily the one through which she deposited the le), and presents a signed
request for the retrieval of the specic le. In RExecution1, GW sends this request
to the other servers. Upon receiving the request the servers check the validity of the
signature on the request and the ownership of the le. If the signature is valid and
the user is the rightful owner of the le, then the server sends its piece of the le
and the hashes of all the other servers’ pieces to GW (RExecution2). As some of
the servers might be faulty, they might send corrupted values to GW. GW establishes
which hashes are the correct ones by computing majority, and discards those pieces
whose hash does not evaluate to the computed one. Finally, the GW reconstructs the le
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 Fields:
Fj Portion of le F stored in server Vj.
H(Fj) Hash of Fj.
 Protocol Flows:
RRequest : U
SU (F)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−! GW
RExecution1 : GW
SU (F)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−! Vj; 8j
RExecution2 : GW
Fj; H(Fi); 16i6n −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Vj; 8j
GW computes:
8j; H(Fj) majority of received H(Fj);
G : set of good indices; G ;;
8j, if Fj evaluates to H(Fj) then G G [f jg;
F Pi2G Fi  T−1i (reconstruct with IDA)
Delivery : U
F −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− GW
Fig. 4. Retrieval Protocol.
using the remaining pieces using IDA, and sends the le to the user (Delivery). Upon
receiving the message supposedly containing le F , the user veries the authenticity
of the le (by, for example, matching it against the receipt on the le which she had
kept for control during Deposit). As before, if the user does not get a response from
GW after some pre-specied period of time, or if she receives a le from the GW
whose signature does not verify, she proceeds to contact another server.
Lemma 3. Protocol Retrieval of Fig. 4 satises the Retrieval Availability condition
of Denition 1.
Proof. By the same reasoning as in Lemma 1, we can assume that the user contacts a
correct GW; then all the correct servers get the user’s request. As we assume that the
user has in fact previously deposited the le and received a receipt, we are guaranteed
that each correct server has saved its piece of the le and hashes of all the pieces (this
follows from the Deposit Correctness property). The servers then send their pieces and
hashes of all pieces to GW. As some of the servers might be faulty, they might send
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corrupted values; however, the fact that n>2t allows GW to determine which hashes
are correct (i.e., have not being altered) by applying majority. Finally, GW applies
IDA to the correct pieces { those which evaluate to the correct hashes { to reconstruct
the le.
Lemmas 1{3 allow us to corroborate our claims of a basic SSRI system with an
asymptotically optimal blow-up:
Theorem 1. If S is a secure signature scheme; then protocols Deposit; Dispersal;
and Retrieval of Figs. 2{4, respectively; satisfy Denition 1. Also; the blow-up of
the stored information is asymptotically optimal.
Basic SSRI provides a stable storage system, but does not give any guarantees about
the secrecy of the information, as IDA does not provide it, and les ow in the clear
between the users and the servers. The question of how to add condentiality is treated
in the next section.
4. Integrity plus condentiality
There might be a need in some applications to store les whose contents must remain
private, i.e., that only the owner of the le would be able to read it. In this section we
show how to provide condentiality on top of the information integrity which basic
SSRI provides, as specied by Denition 2.
A rst solution that comes to mind (and which will be the building block of our
nal solution) is for the user to generate a symmetric key (e.g., a DES key) FK,
encrypt the le F with FK, deposit the encrypted le with the servers and store the
key FK in its local memory. This simple solution satises the denition but has a
major drawback. Now, not only the secrecy of the data relies on the encryption key
FK, but also the availability of the data, as the loss of the key is equivalent to the
loss of all the data encrypted with it. It is clear that simply storing the encryption key
in the user’s memory would be a very weak link in any construction, and hence we
need to provide this key with storage security and availability which are comparable
to the ones provided for the le itself. Thus, the natural solution is to store in some
manner the encryption key itself in SSRI. However, note that simply storing the key
in the clear would violate the condentiality requirement.
4.1. Distributed key management and blinding
Thus, the question of SSRI with condentiality can be reduced to the question of
how to secretly store and retrieve the le encryption key FK, as the encrypted le can
be treated as a regular le, which we already know how to deposit and retrieve. We
now present our solution to the problem.
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Recall from Section 2.7 that in our design each user U has a public=private key pair
for encryption=decryption, EKU ;DKU , where DKU is kept shared among the servers us-
ing threshold cryptography, each server Vj storing dkU;Vj . The user stores the symmetric
encryption key FK by rst computing EEKU (FK), and then using the Deposit protocol
of Fig. 2 to deposit this value with the servers. 6 The fact that DKU is kept shared at
the servers does not allow any coalition of up to t servers (even those including GW)
to decrypt EEKU (FK), and so far the Condentiality requirement is satised.
However, upon a request from the user to retrieve the key and the le, if the servers
used their shares of DKU to send their partial decryptions of EEKU (FK) to GW, GW
would then be able to combine the partial decryptions and extract FK, in direct violation
of the condentiality requirement. To circumvent this problem we use \blinding" (see
Section 2.6) in a novel way.
In a nutshell, the user will start the retrieval process by rst generating a random
integer r; which will be used as a blinding factor. He will then compute EEKU (r) sign
it and send it to GW, who will distribute it to the servers. Now, instead of each server
Vj computing the partial decryption of EEKU (FK) using dkU;Vj , they will compute
the partial decryption of the product EEKU (FK) EEKU (r). As a consequence (assuming
that E is blindable), GW will recover the product r FK, which provides no knowledge
about FK. On the other hand, the user will be able to retrieve FK by factoring out r.
A detailed description of the blinding process is given in the next section. Note that
this approach requires the user to store r securely, though temporarily.
One last issue which needs to be dealt with in this context is the following. Upon
receiving the decrypted blinded key, how does the user know that this is the right
value? (Note that this problem does not arise because of the blinding, but is in fact
a general problem.) This will be solved by adding another round of communication
among the servers in which every server Vi (not just GW) will reconstruct the blinded
key, and then have the server sign this value under skVi . Thus, the user will receive
the blinded key signed under SKV . It remains to be proved that in this case the user
in fact receives the correct blinded key. This will be shown in the next section, where
we describe our full protocol for SSRI with condentiality and prove its correctness.
4.2. Deposit and retrieval with condentiality
We will call the protocols for SSRI with condentiality Conf-Deposit,
Conf-Dispersal, and Conf-Retrieval. Conf-Dispersal will be identical to the
protocol of Fig. 3. Conf-Deposit is a slight modication of protocol Deposit in
Fig. 2. The user generates a symmetric key FK, computes F, eFK(F), and uses pro-
tocol Deposit to store the encrypted le F at the servers. Additionally, the user
encrypts the key FK using his public encryption key EKU (i.e., EEKU (FK)) and also
sends this value to GW, who distributes it to all the other servers (with the echo step
6 In fact, for eciency reasons which will be made clear later, a variant of the protocol should be used
that keeps the encrypted key in its entirety at each server; as this is a small quantity, this variant does not
pose a blow-up problem.
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 Fields:
r Blinding factor: random number chosen by user U .
b EU (r).
F Encrypted user le stored in V .
Fj Portion of the encrypted le dispersed at server Vj.
Pj Partial decryption using dkU;Vj of EEKU (FK  r):
P P=FK  r.
 Protocol Flows:
CRequest : U
b;SU (b; F)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−!GW
CExecution1 : GW
b;SU (b; F)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−! Vj; 8j
CExecution2 : Vj; 8j
Pj−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−! Vj; 8j
CExecution3 : GW
Fj;H( Fi);16i6n; Vj (P) −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Vj; 8j
GW computes F as in Fig. 4;
also computes SV (P).
Delivery : U
F;P;SV (P) −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−GW
Fig. 5. Protocol Conf-Retrieval: retrieval with condentiality.
of Fig. 2). The servers then apply Conf-Dispersal to disperse F but keep the en-
crypted key as is. (The reason for this is that as the encrypted key is a relatively small
quantity, the IDA dispersal process will typically not be worth the eort.) As in the
case of basic SSRI, the user receives a receipt, SV (U; F;EEKU (FK)), for the successful
deposit of the pair (encrypted le, encrypted key). Lemma 1 applies to Conf-Deposit
straightforwardly.
The Conf-Retrieval protocol is shown in Fig. 5. It assumes a blindable encryption
scheme E. At retrieval time, the user U generates a retrieval request by generating a
random integer r, the blinding factor. He then computes b=EEKU (r); he signs b and
the identier of the le he is trying to retrieve (say, the hash of the encrypted le)
using his signing key SKU , and sends the whole thing to the GW (CRequest). He
also stores r securely. GW forwards this request to all the servers (CExecution1).
Each server Vj checks that the user signing this request has permission to access the
le and the encrypted key, and if so, generates a partial decryption Pj of the blinded key
using dkU;Vj , its share of the user’s key DKU . That is each server produces a partial
decryption Pj of the value b  EEKU (FK)=EEKU (r  FK). The servers then distribute
their partial decryptions to all other servers (CExecution2). Having enough partial
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decryptions from the other servers, the servers are able to compute P=FK  r; they
also generate a partial signature on this value. In CExecution3, they send to GW their
pieces of the encrypted le and all the hashes, together with their partial signatures on
the blinded key. As in the original retrieval protocol, GW reconstructs F using IDA,
and sends F and the signed blinded key back to the user (Delivery). The user obtains
the le key FK by dividing out r, and decrypts the le. We now argue the correctness
of the protocols.
Theorem 2. If S is a secure signature scheme and E is a secure blindable encryp-
tion scheme; then protocols Conf-Deposit; Conf-Dispersal; and Conf-Retrieval
satisfy Denition 2: Also; the blow-up of the stored information is asymptotically
optimal.
Proof. The proofs of Deposit Availability and Correctness and of the bound on the
space blow-up are similar to those of Lemmas 1 and 2.
Condentiality. In order to prove that the scheme is t-private, i.e., that no subset
of size at most t has any knowledge of the content of the le, we need to show that
no information about FK is ever known to the servers. Because E is a semantically
secure encryption scheme, any information about the key FK can be computed only
by decrypting it using the key DKU . Because we assume that the threshold decryption
protocol used by the servers is t-secure, no subset of t or less servers can decrypt the
key or obtain any partial information about it. So the only value a coalition of t or
less servers sees is the blinded key P= r  FK . Due to the blinding properties (r is a
randomly-chosen number), the value P is a randomly distributed value which gives no
information about FK.
Retrieval Availability. The argument of Lemma 3 also applies here. However, due
to the encryption=decryption process, it must be additionally shown that the user re-
ceives the right value for the decryption key FK. The signed blinded key that the user
receives is the correct one, due to the following. A correct GW forwards the request for
decryption of EEKU (FK) to all servers. As the request is a proper request signed by the
user, the correct servers decrypt the value EEKU (FK)  b; that is, the encrypted key mul-
tiplied by the blinding factor. Thus, each correct server computes the correct blinded
key, and generates a partial signature on it. As GW can only generate signatures with
the participation of the correct servers, the signature will be on the valid blinded key.
Finally, the user holds the value r, so he is able to compute FK by dividing r out.
5. Secret sharing made shorter
An application of our result which is interesting in its own is an improvement on
the size of the shares for computationally-secure secret sharing protocols [29]. Recall
that in a (threshold) secret sharing protocol a dealer shares a secret s among n servers
so that t servers cannot reconstruct it, but t + 1 can.
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It is a well known fact that for an information theoretically-secure secret sharing
protocol (i.e., one in which t shares give no information about the secret even when
innite computing time is given), the size of the shares must be at least the size of the
secret. In [29] Krawczyk shows that if one relaxes the notion to one of ‘computationally
secure’, then it is possible to obtain shares of size [jsj=(t + 1)] + ‘ where ‘ depends
only on a security parameter. His idea goes as follows:
{ Choose a key K for a symmetric encryption scheme e of length ‘.
{ Encrypt the secret to be shared; let = eK (s):
{ Use IDA [32] to distribute  among the servers so that t + 1 pieces are enough to
reconstruct ; let i be the piece given to the ith server.
{ Share K with an information theoretically secure scheme as in [35]; let Ki be the
share given to the ith server.
By the IDA bound we know that jij= jj=(t+1). Clearly jj= jsj and jKij= ‘; hence
the stated bound.
Our SSRI protocol with condentiality of Section 4 can be thought as a computa-
tionally secure secret sharing scheme. In it we have the servers sharing a secret key
SKV for an asymmetric encryption function E. Let skVi be the share of SKV held by
the ith server. Let the associated public key be PKV . The user who deposits a le can
be thought of as a dealer sharing a secret s according to the following steps:
{ Choose a key K of length ‘ for a symmetric encryption scheme e.
{ Encrypt the secret s; let = eK (s). Encrypt the key with the public key PKV of the
servers; let =EPKV (K).
{ Use IDA [32] to disperse  and  among the servers so that t+1 pieces are enough
to reconstruct ; let i and i be the pieces given to the ith server.
Let m be the length of the keys used by E, i.e., m= jSKV j: Typically we have m>‘.
We can assume that jj=m, thus each server keeps only a share of size (jsj+m)=(t+1)
for each secret s, plus the server holds the share skVi (which is of size m), but that
can be used for several sharings.
Now let’s compare the asymptotic space requirements when sharing N secrets. In
the scheme of [29] the storage requirement is clearly N ([jsj=(t+1)]+‘). In our scheme
the storage needed is N ([(jsj+ m)=(t + 1)]) + m. So for large N (i.e., when (N‘>m)
our scheme requires less storage.
6. Proactive SSRI
The protocols described in the previous sections withstand the presence of an ad-
versary that can read the memory and corrupt the behavior of at most t servers during
the whole lifetime of the system.
If such lifetime is long then the assumption that only t servers can be broken into
may become unreasonable or too optimistic. Proactive Security [3, 30] is an area of
research that deals with secure distributed systems in the presence of an adversary that
may corrupt all the servers during the whole lifetime of the system, although only t at
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a time (i.e., the assumption is that during a pre-specied interval of time (say, a day),
the adversary may break into at most t servers).
Several proactive techniques have been presented in the past. Proactive protocols for
secret sharing were presented in [26], while proactive protocols for threshold cryptog-
raphy were introduced in [16, 20, 25].
A basic technique of Proactive Security is to introduce refreshment phases in the
system. During a refreshment phase a server that has been broken into but is no longer
under the control of the adversary, can be restored to its initial state. In particular,
all the data destroyed or modied by the adversery is restored with the help of the
other servers. Also all secret information (e.g., cryptographic keys) contained in all
the servers is somehow randomized so that the information leaked to the adversery
in the previous time intervals will be useless in the future. Refreshment phases are
invoked periodically regardless of the fact that break-ins have been detected or not.
The \proactivization" of our distributed storage system poses several interesting ques-
tions. At refreshing time we need to restore the memory of potentially compromised
servers. This can indeed be done as by assumption only a minority of the servers
might have been broken into during the previous interval. However, such a restoring
operation can be potentially very expensive. Indeed, in order to restore the pieces of
a server we need to recompute all the les and disperse them again. This means that
at refreshing time the whole memory of the system has to circulate around in order
to restore eventual break-ins. This can potentially be an enormous task and should be
performed only if strictly necessary. For example, if in the previous interval the adver-
sary did not produce any damage (or corrupted only a small fraction of the memory
of the system), the above task would be too expensive.
What we need is a form of \adaptive" proactiveness in which the system performs
the expensive restoring only when it is really necessary, while routine refreshment
phases are cheaper to perform.
We describe our solutions, rst for the integrity-only case (which is really the most
interesting and novel) and then for the integrity plus condentiality (which is just an
application of proactive threshold cryptography).
Integrity only. Recall from Section 3 that each le being deposited is rst dispersed
using our variation of SIDA [28]. This means that each server Vi; 16i6n; will have
an IDA piece of F; Fi, plus all the \ngerprints" of all the pieces H(F1); : : : ;H(Fn).
By assumption during any given time interval only a minority of the servers can be
corrupted. At the beginning of the refreshing phase each server broadcasts to the other
servers the ngerprints. Server Vi takes a majority vote among the received ngerprints
to identify the correct ones. It then checks if its own ngerprints are correct. If they
are corrupted, it replaces them with the correct ones. It then checks its own IDA piece
Fi against the correct ngerprint H(Fi). If the piece has been modied it broadcasts a
message asking the other servers to reconstruct Fi for it. It then takes majority among
the received responses to identify the correct Fi.
Notice that if the adversary was not present (or did no damage) in the previous
time interval, then only the ngerprints of the stored les must circulate during the
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refreshment phase. This is clearly a negligible communication cost compared to the
whole storage of the system. If the adversary did some damage, then the communi-
cation complexity of the refreshing phase is still proportional only to the amount of
information the adversary corrupted and not to the whole memory of the system.
Integrity and condentiality. In this case the refreshment phase will consist rst of
all the integrity-only refreshment phase, carried out on the encrypted les. However,
in this scenario we need to worry about an adversary who besides corrupting the les,
might also read the shares of the users’ secret keys kept at a server. Once he reads
more than t + 1 of such shares the adversary will be able to decrypt the user’s les.
But the shares of the secret keys can be proactivized using the proactive techniques
used in threshold cryptography (for discrete log-based schemes see [25]; for RSA-
based schemes see [16]). The refreshment phases for proactive threshold cryptography
schemes have a communication complexity proportional to the size of the keys. So once
again in the optimistic case (i.e., when the adversary does not corrupt the memory of
the system) the work done in a refreshment phase is very small compared to the
potential amount of memory of the system.
Acknowledgements
The authors are thankful to Hugo Krawczyk for his many useful comments.
Appendix A. Overview of the information dispersal algorithm
The Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) uses a linear transformation to convert
m= n − t bytes of input into n bytes of output. This transformation is given by an
m n matrix T over GF(28). Moreover, the matrix T has the property that every (n−t)
columns of T are linearly independent. Thus, each input and output byte is viewed as
an element of GF(28). The block size is m bytes and the operation is repeated for
every m bytes.
Let the (i; j)th entry of T be represented by Ti; j: Let P0; P1; : : : ; Pm−1 be a block of
input. Then the output bytes Q0; Q1; : : : ; Qi; : : : ; Qn−1 are given by
Qi=T0; i  P0 + T1; i  P1 + : : : Tm−1; i  Pm−1;
where the arithmetic is performed in the eld GF(28).
Given any m output bytes, the input can be recovered because every m columns of
T are linearly independent. In other words, the matrix S formed by taking the columns
of T which correspond to these m output bytes is invertible. Again, the inverse of this
matrix is computed over GF(28).
As an example, let m=3, and n=5. The following matrix T has the property that
every 3 columns of T are linearly independent. Note that we are using polynomials in x
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for representing elements of GF(28). The polynomial arithmetic can be done modulo
x8 + x6 + x5 + x4 + 1; which is an irreducible polynomial over GF(2).
T =
0
@
1 0 0 1 1 + x
0 1 0 1 x
0 0 1 1 1
1
A :
If for example, only the rst, second and fth byte of a coded text are known, the
plaintext (or original text) can be retrieved by applying the following transformation
to the three bytes of coded text:
0
@
1 0 1 + x
0 1 x
0 0 1
1
A :
(Note that this matrix is its own inverse.) The reader is referred to [32] for further
details.
Appendix B. Example: threshold RSA
We give a specic example of threshold cryptography assuming that the public key
cryptosystem used is RSA [34] and for a specic choice of the public exponent, e.g. 3.
In this case, the public encryption key of user U is
EKU =(3; N );
where N is the RSA module, and
DKU =(d; N );
where d is the inverse of 3 modulo (N ). Assume that the user’s secret key DKU has
been shared among the servers as an n-out-of-n sharing, meaning that all the shares
will be required in order to reconstruct the key (this is without loss generality, as it is
easy to generalize to a threshold scheme).
We can assume that server Vj’s share of the key is
dkU;Vj =dj;
where
d1 +   + dn=dmod(N ):
Assume we want to compute a signature =mdmod n for a message m. Then each
server can compute the following
j =mdj modN
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and then we see that
1  2    n=md1     mdn =md1++dn =md= :
A dual approach clearly works for RSA signatures.
Appendix C. Example: blinding with RSA
Once again we present an example of the blinding technique [5] based on RSA.
The server owns the secret key DK= (d; N ) and the user knows the public key
EK= (e; N ). The user wants to decrypt a ciphertext c=memodN without telling the
server c. The user chooses r at random and computes s= remodN: The user then
gives cs=(mr)emodN to the server who returns w=(cs)d=mrmodN . Finally, the
user computes m=w=rmodN:
Appendix D. On alternative designs
In this section we compare the costs { in terms of computation, storage and com-
munication { of our single connection=gateway design to those of having the user
communicate with the servers independently and in parallel. It turns out that besides
providing for broad applicability, the single connection design is more ecient both at
the user and servers ends.
D.1. Cost at the user
The computation and communication costs for the user in the single connection
model is always lower than having the user communicate directly with all (that is, at
least t+1 of) the servers, as the tables below indicate. It may seem at rst that due to
the communication with a single gateway our design requires expensive cryptographic
machinery (such as threshold cryptography) to meet the security requirements. How-
ever, one should note that the use of threshold cryptography can be removed only at
the expense of heavy computations and=or heavy memory requirements at the user’s
end. Even when communicating with all the servers the user still needs to receive a
receipt for the transaction. Thus, he can go one of two ways:
{ Have each server sign an individual receipt for the deposit; this in turn requires the
user to verify and store n signatures.
{ To save on storage, use threshold cryptography (which means no savings on cryp-
tographic machinery); but this requires the user to verify n partial signatures, which
typically is a more expensive verication process than verication of a regular sig-
nature (for example, in the case of RSA one can use a small verication exponent
for regular signatures, but not for partial signatures).
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Table 1
Computation and storage costs of Deposit with Condentiality at the user
Single connection Multiple connections
Split at user Split at servers
1 encryption IDA secret sharing
2 signatures (expected); secret sharing 1 encryption
t + 1 signatures (worst-case) n signatures 1 signature
1 small signature verication; n small signature verications,
1 signature storage if store n signatures
OR
n big signature verications,
if store 1 signature
Table 2
Computation costs of Retrieval with Condentiality at the user
Single connection Multiple connections
Split at user Split at servers
1 signature verication n signature verications
(small exponent) (big exponent)
1 encryption 1 decryption
(small exponent; for blinding) (big exponent)
With respect to blinding, we note that the removal of the blinding step would result
in the user needing to decrypt n shares of the le key FK, as opposed to a single
blinding operation which is an encryption with a small exponent.
For the comparison, we consider the case of Deposit with Condentiality, where
symmetric-key encryption and decryption are also performed. We divide the multiple
connections model into two, depending on whether the IDA \split" of the le is done at
the user or at the servers. Let us consider rst the communication costs. Let B denote
the blow-up factor (see Denition 3) and c be a constant. Then the communication
cost for Deposit in the case of a single connection is jF j+ c: On the other hand, it is
easy to verify that the cost in the multiple connections model would be BjF j + nc if
the IDA split is performed at the user, or n(jF j+ c) if performed at the servers.
Table 1 shows the number of operations and storage requirements at the user to
perform Deposit with Condentiality, while Table 2 shows the costs for Retrieval. In
short, both tables show that the costs of multiple connections are higher than in our
single connection model.
D.2. Cost at the servers
We now analyze the computational=communication requirements on the servers.
Again, it may seem at rst that if the user communicates with each of the servers
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directly this should reduce the workload for the servers and the total communication
among them. However, if the user communicates with all the servers and they do not
perform the \echo" stage, then it is possible for an adversary to create a valid receipt
for a le that the servers will not be able to reconstruct later. In turn, this would result
in a liability problem for the storage system.
More specically, consider the scenario of a fraudulent user colluding with t faulty
servers. The user sends the le to t + 1 servers (t faulty and 1 correct), and thus is
able to obtain a receipt. In order for the servers to be able to retrieve the le later
they will have to either:
{ store the whole le (which entails a blow-up factor of n); or
{ echo the le so that there is a guarantee that if a correct server has it, then all the
other good servers have it as well.
Thus, there are no savings in communication for the servers in the multiple connections
model. Notice that in the single connection model this kind of coalitions is not a
problem, as this case can be easily reduced to the case where the gateway is faulty.
Under slightly dierent assumptions about the model, which we will now explain,
the attack above is plausible even without the user being malicious. We conceive the
communication between the user and the servers to take place on a public network,
such as the Internet, while the communication among the servers to be on a more
secure \Intranet". If we assume that the adversary can drop or block messages on the
public network, but not on the Intranet, then the adversary can have only t+1 servers
receive it: t faulty and 1 correct; these servers will produce a valid receipt, and then
we are back in the situation described above. Once again, this is not a problem in
our model since an adversary that blocks messages on the public network can create
at most a denial-of-service attack, which is eectively similar to the one of failing
(\crashing") the gateway.
Finally, as pointed out in Section 2.8, the communication among the servers (the
echo messages) can be further reduced by echoing only a message digest (hash) of
the les, and the actual les only if necessary.
References
[1] R. Blahut, Theory and Practice of Error Control Codes, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1984.
[2] C. Boyd, Digital multisignatures, in: H. Baker, F. Piper (Eds.), Cryptography and Coding, Claredon
Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 241{246.
[3] R. Canetti, A. Herzberg, Maintaining security in the presence of transient faults, in: Y. Desmedt (Ed.),
Advances in cryptography { Crypto ’94, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 839, Springer, Berlin,
1994, pp. 425{438.
[4] M. Cerecedo, T. Matsumoto, H. Imai, Ecient and secure multiparty generation of digital signatures
based on discrete logarithms, IEICE Trans. Fundamentals E76-A (4) (1993) 532{545.
[5] D. Chaum, Blind signatures for untraceable payments, in: Advances in Cryptology { Crypto ’82, in: D.
Chaum, R. Rivest and A. Sherman (eds.), Plenum, New York, 1983. pp. 199{203.
[6] P. Chen, J. Garay, A. Herzberg, H. Krawczyk, A security architecture for the internet protocol, IBM
Systems J. 37 (1) (1998) 42{60.
388 J.A. Garay et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 243 (2000) 363{389
[7] B. Chor, S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, B. Awerbuch, Veriable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity
in the presence of faults, in: Proc. 26th Annu. Symp. on the Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE,
Press, New York, 1985, pp. 383{395.
[8] R.A. Croft, S.P. Harris, Public-key cryptography and re-usable shared secrets, in: H. Baker, F. Piper
(Eds.), Cryptography and Coding, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 189{201.
[9] A. De Santis, Y. Desmedt, Y. Frankel, M. Yung, How to share a function securely, in: Proc. 26th
Annu. Symp. on the Theory of Computing, ACM, New York, 1994, pp. 522{533.
[10] Y. Desmedt, Y. Frankel, Shared generation of authenticators and signatures, in: J. Feigenbaum (Ed.),
Advances in Cryptology { Crypto ’91, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 576, Springer, Berlin,
1991, pp. 457{469.
[11] Y. Desmedt, Society and group oriented cryptography: a new concept, in: C. Pomerance (Ed.), Advances
in Cryptology { Crypto ’87, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 293, Springer, Berlin, 1987,
pp. 120{127.
[12] Y. Desmedt, Y. Frankel, Threshold cryptosystems, in: G. Brassard (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology {
Crypto ’89, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 435, Springer, Berlin, 1989, pp. 307{315.
[13] Y. Desmedt, Threshold cryptography, Eur. Trans. Telecom. 5 (4) (1994) 449{457.
[14] Y. Frankel, P. Gemmell, P. Mackenzie, M. Yung, Optimal resilience proactive public-key cryptosystems,
in: Proc. 38th Annu. Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE, Press, New York, 1997,
pp. 384{393.
[15] Y. Frankel, P. Gemmell, M. Yung, Witness-based cryptographic program checking and robust function
sharing, in: Proc. 28th Annu. Symp. on The Theory of Computing, ACM, New York, 1996, pp. 499{508.
[16] Y. Frankel, P. Gemmell, P. Mackenzie, M. Yung, Proactive RSA, in: B. Kaliski (Ed.), Advances
in Cryptology { Crypto ’97, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1294, Springer, Berlin, 1997,
pp. 440{454.
[17] T. ElGamal, A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms, IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory IT-31 (4) (1985) 469{472.
[18] J. Garay, R. Gennaro, C. Jutla, T. Rabin, Secure distributed storage and retrieval, in: M. Mavronicolas,
P. Tsigas (Eds.), 11th Internat. Workshop, WDAG ’97, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1320,
Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 275{289.
[19] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, T. Rabin, Robust and ecient sharing of RSA functions, in:
N. Koblitz (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology { Crypto ’96 Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1109,
Springer, Berlin, 1996, pp. 157{172.
[20] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, T. Rabin, Robust threshold DSS signatures, in: Ueli Maurer (Ed.),
Advances in Cryptology { Eurocrypt ’96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1070, Springer,
Berlin, 1996, pp. 354{371.
[21] R. Gennaro, M. Rabin, T. Rabin, Simplied vss and fast-track multiparty computations with applications
to threshold cryptography, Manuscript, 1997.
[22] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, Probabilistic encryption, J. Comput. System Sci. 28 (2) (1984) 270{299.
[23] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, R. Rivest, A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message
attacks, SIAM J. Comput. 17 (2) (1988) 281{308.
[24] L. Harn, Group oriented (t; n) digital signature scheme, IEE Proc.-Comput. Digit. Tech. 141 (5) (1994)
307{313.
[25] A. Herzberg, M. Jakobsson, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, M. Yung, Proactive public key and signature
systems, in: ACM Conf. on Computers and Communication Security, 1997.
[26] A. Herzberg, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, M. Yung, Proactive secret sharing, or: how to cope with perpetual
leakage, in: D. Coppersmith (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology { Crypto ’95, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 963, Springer, Berlin, 1995, pp. 339{352.
[27] K. Hickman, Secure Socket Library, Netscape Communications Corp. <http:==www.mcom.com=info
=SSL.html.
[28] H. Krawczyk, Distributed ngerprints and secure information dispersal, in: Proc. 13th ACM Symp. on
Principles of Distributed Computation, ACM, New York, 1993, pp. 207{218.
[29] H. Krawczyk, Secret sharing made short, in: D. Stinson (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology { Crypto ’93,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 773, Springer, Berlin, 1993, pp. 136{146.
[30] R. Ostrovsky, M. Yung, How to withstand mobile virus attacks in: Proc. 10th ACM Symp. on Principles
of Distributed Computation, ACM, New York, 1991, pp. 51{59.
J.A. Garay et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 243 (2000) 363{389 389
[31] C. Park, K. Kurosawa, New ElGamal type threshold digital signature scheme, IEICE Trans.
Fundamentals E79-A (1) (1996) 86{93.
[32] M. Rabin, Ecient dispersal of information for security, load balancing, and fault tolerance, J. ACM
36 (2) (1989) 335{348.
[33] T. Rabin, A simplied approach to threshold and proactive RSA, in: H. Krawczyk (Ed.), Advances in
Cryptology { Crypto ’98, LNCS, vol. 1462, Springer, Berlin, 1998, pp. 89{104.
[34] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman, A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key
cryptosystems, Comm. ACM 21 (2) (1978) 120{126.
[35] A. Shamir, How to share a secret, Comm. ACM 22 (1979) 612{613.
